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JUVENILE PRIVACY: A MINOR'S RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES
I. Introduction
Although the Constitution does not specifically grant any right to
privacy, the Supreme Court, through a process of judicial interpre-
tation, has carefully guarded some individual rights in this area.,
The Court has made it clear that the right to privacy prevents
unjustified governmental interference with an individual's ability to
make certain personal decisions.2
The Supreme Court specifically acknowledged a minor's right to
privacy in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,3
where the Court held that this right made it unnecessary to obtain
parental consent for an abortion decision.' The Court expanded a
minor's right to privacy to include access to contraceptives in Carey
v. Population Services International,5 holding unconstitutional' a
New York statute which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to
minors.'
This note will trace briefly the historical development of an
adult's right to privacy, explore and evaluate the minor's right of
1. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (contraception); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(child rearing and education).
3. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
4. Id. at 74-75.
5. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
6. Id. at 693-700.
7. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6811(8)(McKinney 1972) (repealed 1977). The law provided that:
It shall be a class A misdemeanor for:
8. Any person to sell or distribute any instrument or article, or any recipe, drug or
medicine for the prevention of conception to a minor under the age of sixteen years;
the sale or distribution of such to a person other than a minor under the age of sixteen
years is authorized only by a licensed pharmacist but the advertisement or display of
said articles, within or without the premises of such pharmacy is hereby prohibited
Id.
The Carey Court held all three of the subsections of this statute to be unconstitutional.
431 U.S. at 681-702.
It must be noted that this statute was concerned only with a class of minors, those under
sixteen years of age.
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access to contraceptives, and focus on parental involvement in a
minor's personal decisions regarding abortion and contraceptives.
1I. Development of the Adult's Right to Privacy
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States,' was the first Supreme Court Justice to recognize the right
to privacy." Brandeis' recognition is based on the underlying philos-
ophy that an individual should lead his life as free from governmen-
tal interference as possible.' The Supreme Court established a per-
sonal marital right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut," which
held a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
adults'" to be unconstitutional and violative of marital privacy.' 3
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold developed a consti-
tutional right to privacy premised upon the existence of certain
"peripheral rights" not actually mentioned in the Bill of Rights
which help make the specific rights more secure. 4 He pointed out
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9. Id. at 478. Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. . . . [tihey sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most conprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.
Id.
10. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court began to recognize a right to privacy in several cases
before Griswold. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In addition, the Court has recog-
nized a right to associational privacy. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)(repealed 1969).
13. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
14. Id. at 482-83. For example, the right of freedom of speech and press not only includes
the right to utter or print, but also the rights to distribute, receive, and read. See Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
The majority opinion's theory was that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance." 381 U.S. at 484.
In addition to the majority opinion, three other Justices posited theories regarding protec-
tion for the right to privacy.
Justice Harlan, who concurred in the judgment, contended that the right to privacy is not
dependent on any of the Bill of Rights provisions, rather that the Due Process Clause implic-
itly protects this right. Id. at 500.
Justice Goldberg, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, used the
ninth amendment to protect the right to privacy. Justice Goldberg asserted that the ninth
amendment was intended to protect personal rights not specifically listed in the first eight
NOTES
that the various guarantees, such as those in the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments create "zones of privacy."' 5 He ex-
plained that the marriage relationship lay within the "zone of pri-
vacy" created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
"[Florbidding the use of contraceptives . . ..." he stated, has "a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship."' 7
Griswold's importance lies in its protection of a married couple's
right to privacy and their use of contraceptives. Moreover, Griswold
is also significant because it gave broad recognition to the right to
privacy, without basing the right on any specific constitutional priv-
ilege. Griswold resulted in a body of rights whose content was sug-
gested by specific constitutional provisions but not restricted in
scope and content by the enumerated rights. Thus, it opened the
door for further protection of privacy.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"5 a physician was convicted for dispensing
contraceptives to an unmarried woman in violation of Massachu-
setts law, which allowed only married persons to obtain contracep-
tives. 9 The Supreme Court declared that unmarried adults pos-
sessed the same rights as married adults regarding the use of contra-
ceptives.20 But the Eisenstadt Court neither endorsed nor rejected
further application of the right to privacy rationale stated in
Griswold. In fact, the Eisenstadt Court left Griswold open to two
possible interpretations concerning access to contraceptives.2' First,
a plurality of the Court stated, "[i]f under Griswold the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a
ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally imper-
missible."" The plurality's other interpretation was that "if
Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contracep-
tives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection
amendments. Id. at 492.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Black, with whom Justice Stewart joined, argued simply
that there is no constitutional right to privacy since it is not listed in any specific provision
of the Constitution. Id. at 509-10.
15. Id. at 484.
16. Id. at 485.
17. Id.
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. Id. at 440-41.
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Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married per-
sons."
23
Despite the Court's refusal to adopt either of these interpreta-
tions, the Eisenstadt decision means that whatever rights an indi-
vidual has to acquire contraceptives, the equal protection clause
guarantees that these rights be the same for married and unmarried
adults. The Court nevertheless, explicitly granted unmarried adults
the right to use contraceptives.24 The rationale of Griswold and
Eisenstadt was extended in Roe v. Wade25 to establish as fundamen-
tal a woman's right to have an abortion. 2 The Wade Court recog-
nized that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2
protected an individual's right to privacy. 2 While the Court recog-
nized that the right to privacy included the abortion decision, it also
asserted that "this right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation.""
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has utilized four different tests
to determine the constitutionality of state regulations or classifica-
tions.3 ° Because the Supreme Court has concluded that the right to
23. Id. at 454.
24. Id. at 453.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. At the foundation of the Court's reasoning was an enlargement of the right to privacy
which, as Justice Blackmun stated in the majority opinion, is "founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty [and] is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."Id. at 153.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. 410 U.S. at 152.
29. Id. at 154.
30. The first test, the rational basis test, is inapplicable since it deals primarily with
business or economic regulations. The Supreme Court established the rational basis test in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934), which held that the state may regulate
business or economic matters unless the regulation is palpably unreasonable or arbitrary.
The second test, the rational justification test, is somewhat more restrictive. This test
requires the state to show a reasonable justification for its regulation or classification.
Compare Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
The most rigid test the Supreme Court has established is the compelling state interest
standard. Under this test when various classifications regarded as "suspect" are involved, the
Court will require that the state demonstrate an utmost need in order to use a "suspect"
classification. See, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)(alienage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)(race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)(national origin).
But other cases have established classifications which are not suspect. See, Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegtimacy); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
[Vol. VI
19781 NOTES
privacy is a fundamental right, the state must show a compelling
state interest before it may regulate this right.31 With this test as
the applicable standard, the Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population
Services International,3" held that adults possessed a constitutional
right of access to contraceptives." It reasoned that Griswold "may
no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a
married couple's use of contraceptives." 4 It also correctly inter-
preted Eisenstadt as holding that the protected right is the
U.S. 307 (1976)(age); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth or
poverty).
In addition, the Supreme Court will require the compelling state interest standard in order
to infringe upon certain rights deemed "fundamental". A fundamental right is any right
based on principles of justice that are "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and
which "lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. ... Herbert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
Although the Supreme Court has recognized several rights as fundamental, it has not
explicitly defined a fundamental right. It is possible that the Court has done so intentionally
so as not to restrict their future determinations. Among the rights the Court has deemed
fundamental are: Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)(right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)(right to travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963)(right to the free exercise of religion).
The final test, the fair and substantial justification test, may be characterized as a mid-
point standard. It is more restrictive than the rational justification test, and less demanding
than the compelling interest standard. This test requires the state to offer detailed proof that
its regulation or classification is substantially related to the achievement of important govern-
mental objectives. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974).
It is essential to determine whether or not the right to privacy is a fundamental right. If it
is a fundamental right then any restriction on the right must meet the rigid scrutiny of the
compelling state interest standard; if privacy is not a fundamental right any regulation of
the right to privacy need only satisfy one of the less demanding tests.
31. The status of the right to privacy as a fundamental right remained uncertain even
after Eisenstadt. The Eisenstadt Court indicated that if a fundamental freedom was involved
the state must show a compelling interest. 405 U.S. at 447 n.7. However, the Court chose to
apply a rational justification standard in holding the state regulation unconstitutional. Id.
at 447.
However, Roe v. Wade established the right to privacy as a fundamental right. The Court
accomplished this by requiring the state to meet the compelling state interest test before it
could regulate a woman's abortion decision. 410 U.S. at 155-56. The right to privacy encom-
passes the abortion decision, and since the compelling interest standard is applied only to
fundamental rights, one can conclude that the right to privacy is a fundamental right.
32. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
33. Id. at 686-91. The Court used a different test to determine a minor's right of access to
contraceptives. See notes 54-56 infra.
34. Id. at 687.
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"decision whether to bear or beget a child."35 Similarly, in Wade the
Court held that the Constitution protected "a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.''"
Thus, the Carey Court concluded that, when read in the light of
Eisenstadt and Wade, the Griswold holding stands for the proposi-
tion that the Constitution protects from unjustified governmental
intrusion an individual's decisions with respect to childbearing.3
Although Carey held that the Constitution protected these deci-
sions, state regulation of access to contraceptives would still be
upheld if a sufficiently compelling state interest existed. The Carey
Court required a compelling state interest, not because there existed
a fundamental right" of access to contraceptives, but rather because
such access was interconnected with the exercise of the constitution-
ally protected decision in regard to childbearing that underlies
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Wade.39
The Carey Court then concluded that the interests the state ad-
vanced did not satisfy the compelling interest standard. First, the
state advanced an interest in protecting potential life.4" This inter-
est might not be valid in light of the Wade decision. If Wade failed
to recognize this state interest during the first trimester of preg-
nancy,4 then certainly the same must be true before conception.
Second, the state contended that there is an interest in protecting
health." However, as Eisenstadt indicated, it is difficult to under-
stand how a statute which involves a nonhazardous contraceptive
could bear a relation to the state's interest in protecting health.43
Thus, since the state had failed to meet the necessary standard, the
Carey Court concluded that a state may not regulate access to con-
traceptives to persons over sixteen years of age."
These Supreme Court decisions establish broad protection for an
adult's right to privacy. This right includes a woman's abortion
35. 405 U.S. at 453. (emphasis added).
36. 410 U.S. at 153. (emphasis added).
37. 431 U.S. at 687.
38. See note 30 supra.
39. 431 U.S. at 688-89.
40. Id. at 690.
41. 410 U.S. at 163.
42. 431 U.S. at 690.
43. 405 U.S. at 450-52.
44. 431 U.S. at 690-91.
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decision45 and the use of" and access to 7 contraceptives. However,
these cases have left open the question of application of this consti-
tutional protection to minors.
III. Development of a Minor's Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court decision in In re Gault'" established that
minors as well as adults possessed constitutional rights.'" The Court
stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." 5 However, the Gault holding was limited
to four procedural rights in a delinquency proceeding"' and neither
recognized nor discussed any juvenile right to privacy.
The Supreme Court recognized a juvenile's right to privacy in
terms of an abortion decision in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth.5" The Court held unconstitutional a state re-
quirement that a minor obtain her parents' written consent to have
an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.53
Danforth established the test to determine whether the state may
restrict a minor's right to privacy. In contrast to the compelling
state interest test,5' state regulations restricting the privacy rights
of minors are valid only if they serve a "significant state interest."55
This test is clearly less demanding than the compelling interest
standard.
45. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 11-24 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 32-44 and accompanying text supra.
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. The Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), ruled for the first time on a
case that exclusively involved constitutional rights of a child. Kent emphasized the need for
juvenile court proceedings to satisfy "the basic requirements of due process and fairness."
Id. at 553.
50. 387 U.S. at 13.
51. The four procedural rights protected were: the right to notice of the charges, id. at
31-34, the right to counsel, id. at 34-42, the right to confront and cross-examine the witness,
id. at 42-56, and the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 56-57.
The Supreme Court has recognized various other procedural rights of minors. See, e.g.,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)(due process in civil contexts); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970)(requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
In addition, the Court has extended certain first amendment rights to minors. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(freedom of speech).
52. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
53. Id. at 72-75.
54. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
55. 428 U.S. at 75.
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The Danforth Court was correct when it established a less rigor-
ous standard for state regulation of a minor's conduct. This less
rigid test is appropriate as the state must have greater latitude to
regulate the conduct of minors." That minors are generally less
capable of making important decisions clearly justifies this less'
demanding standard.
IV. A Minor's Right of Access to Contraceptives
The Supreme Court in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional57 sought to determine if a minor's right to privacy encom-
passed the right of access to contraceptives in light of the "signifi-
cant state interest test." Mr. Justice Brennan writing for a plural-
ity of the Court concluded that the state may not restrict access to
contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age.5" Although
Carey furthered the rights of minors with respect to this particular
right to privacy, it was a plurality decision and its strength may be
limited. The Supreme Court Justices in Carey reached three
distinct conclusions on the issue of a minor's access to contracep-
tives."
A. Unrestricted Right
The plurality recognized and reiterated the Danforth view that
the significant interest standard was applicable, since the state at-
tempted to regulate a minor's right10 Justice Brennan set out three
reasons why restricting a minor's access to contraceptives did not
satisfy the significant interest test.
The first reason was premised upon an analogy between the deci-
56. The Supreme Court has recognized the need for broader authority over minors in a
variety of contexts. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(the Court denied
minors the right to distribute religious literature on public streets); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)(the Court allowed parents to reject mail that was sent
to their minor children).
57. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
58. Id. at 691-99. The Court did not specifically decide the extent to which the state may
safeguard any rights parents may have in such a matter.
59. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun joined. These four Justices espoused an unrestricted right of access to
contraceptives. Id. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens acknowledged the right but not as
unrestricted. Id. at 702-17. Two Justices failed to recognize this right. Chief Justice Burger
dissented in Carey without opinion. Id. at 702. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion
in which he rejected a minor's right of access to contraceptives. Id. at 717-19.
60. Id. at 693.
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sion to use contraceptives and an abortion decision. As Danforth
indicated, the state may not impose an absolute parental veto over
a minor's abortion decision." The plurality noted the Danforth
holding and reasoned that it should similarly decide the constitu-
tionality of a blanket prohibition against the distribution of contra-
ceptives to minors. 2 The Carey plurality reached the proper conclu-
sion, for as Justice Brennan stated, "[tihe State's interests in the
protection . . . of the pregnant minor . . . are clearly more impli-
cated in the abortion decision than by the decision to use a nonha-
zardous contraceptive." 3
Justice Brennan used the Danforth abortion decision as the basis
of extending the right to privacy to include access to contraceptives.
However, the plurality in Carey went further than the Danforth
Court. The Carey plurality viewed the right as unrestricted while
the Danforth Court contended that not every minor was capable of
making these personal decisions without assistance. 4 An unre-
stricted right of access to contraceptives appears to be inconsistent
with the view that minors are less capable of making important
decisions, a view which the Carey plurality itself accepted. 5 None-
theless, Justice Brennan concluded that the absolute state restric-
tion did not satisfy the significant interest standard.
The state contended that there was a significant interest in re-
stricting access to contraceptives because "free availability to mi-
nors of contraceptives would lead to increased sexual activity among
the young ... ."66 The plurality agreed that the state has an inter-
est "to protect the welfare of children," and to see that they are
"safeguarded from abuses" which could inhibit their "growth into
free and independent well-developed men [women] and citizens." 7
It refused to accept the state's reasoning that prohibiting access to
61. 428 U.S. at 74-75.
62. 431 U.S. at 694. Justice Stevens, however, distinguished a minor's decision to abort
her pregnancy from her decision to use contraceptives, and contended that the Constitution
did not afford these decisions the same protection. Justice Stevens reasoned that "[the
former must bear a child unless she aborts; but persons in the latter category can and
generally will avoid childbearing by abstention." Id. at 713.
63. Id. at 694.
64. 428 U.S. at 75.
65. 431 U.S. at 692.
66. Id. at 694.
67. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 165.
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contraceptives would increase the hazards of sexual activity for
minors, and thus deter such conduct. 8 In fact, Mr. Justice Brennan
found significant evidence that indicated no such deterrent effect. 9
The high incidence of teenage sexuality0 would seem to
strengthen, rather than weaken, the merits of the plurality's argu-
ment. The current prevalence of promiscuity among minors strongly
suggests that minors have a need for access to contraceptives. More-
over, a large part of this sexually active teenage group is not only
unaware of the risks of pregnancy7' but often fails to use any method
of birth control.7 2
The principal harms of sexual activity among the young are
venereal disease, premarital pregnancy, and their accompany-
ing physical and psychological effects. 3 These problems may be
avoided by abstention; but practically speaking, access to contra-
ceptives for minors greatly reduces the minor's exposure to disease
and unwanted pregnancy.
Although a plurality of the Supreme Court took judicial notice of
this information and these statistics," it utilized a more legal basis
for its decision. Justice Brennan stated:
68. 431 U.S. at 694-95.
69. Id. The most recent study on teenage sexual activity revealed that prohibiting access
to contraceptives did not deter a minor's sexual conduct. See Zelnick and Kantner, Sexual
and Contraceptive Experience of Young Women in the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9(2)
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 55 (1977). The Zelnick and Kantner study revealed that, of
the girls surveyed, 75% of those under 14 were sexually active before seeking their first use of
contraceptives. Sixty percent of all 14 year olds, 50% of all 15 year olds, and approximately
46% of all 16 year olds were sexually active before seeking their first use of contraceptives.
Zelnick and Kantner at 68.
70. The Zelnick and Kantner study indicated that, as of 1976, approximately 34.9% of
all single women between the ages of 15 and 19 engaged in sexual intercourse. Id. at 56.
71. Id. at 58. The study revealed that only 40.6% of teenage girls between the ages of 15
and 19 knew their period of greatest fertility. In fact, only 29.5% of 15 year olds and 33.5% of
16 year olds correctly identified this period. Id.
72. Id. at 56. The study determined that, of the 15 year olds surveyed, 38.0% never used
contraceptives, 32.5% sometimes used them, and 29.5% always used them; of the 16 year olds,
30.9% never used contraceptives, 38.7% sometimes used them, and 30.5% always used them.
Id. at 62.
73. An unwanted pregnancy and teenage motherhood can create serious personal prob-
lems. Some of these problems include the stigma of unwed motherhood, the need to drop out
of school, early marriage (which frequently ends in divorce), death due to pregnancy, and
even suicide. Pilpel and Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and the Law, 1 (1) FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPEC"VES 29 (1969).
74. Justice Stevens pointed this out in his concurring opinion in Carey. 431 U.S. at 714
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. at 695-96.
NOTES
It is enough that we again confirm the principle that when a State, as here,
burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to justify that bur-
den as a rational means for the accomplishment of some significant state
policy requires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete
absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a pol-
icy.76
Basically this statement of the Carey plurality asserts that the
state cannot meet the significant interest standard with assertions
that lack sufficiently supportive evidence.
B. Limited Right of Access to Contraceptives
Justices Stevens, White, and Powell disagreed with Mr. Justice
Brennan's approach allowing minors an unrestricted constitutional
right to put contraceptives to their intended use." Justices Stevens
and White described as "frivolous" the argument that minors have
this unrestricted right.78 Justice Powell expressed a similar reason
for disagreement with the plurality's opinion. He asserted that
"there is considerably more room for state regulation in this area
than would be permissible under the plurality's opinion. 79
This less permissive approach is consistent with both the recogni-
tion of a minor's right to privacy and the generally accepted view
that the minor has a lesser capability for making decisions." The
approach allows a minor access to contraceptives, but permits state
intervention when the minor is incapable of making these impor-
tant personal decisions.
The three Justices applied two different standards to determine
the validity of the state regulation in Carey. Justice Powell incor-
rectly utilized a rational basis test.8" The Court has often used this
test in relation to business regulations. 2 In applying this test Justice
Powell concluded that the state could regulate a minor's access to
76. Id. at 696.
77. Id. at 702-16.
78. Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, accepted Justice Stevens' description of an unre-
stricted right of access to contraceptives as "frivolous." Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result in part).
79. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
80. See notes 54-56 supra.
81. 431 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82. See note 30 supra.
1978]
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contraceptives, but that this particular restriction was invalid. 3
Justices White and Stevens correctly applied the significant in-
terest test to the state's regulation of a minor's access to contracep-
tives. In applying this standard, both Justices reached the same
conclusion as the plurality. Justice White reasoned that the regula-
tion was invalid because the state had failed to show that it cur-
tailed sexual activity among minors. 4 He asserted, "the State has
not demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of con-
traceptives to minors measurably contributes to the deterrent pur-
poses which the State advances as justification for the restriction." 5
Justice Stevens appropriately criticized the state's motive
regulating access to contraceptives. He asserted that statutes pro-
hibiting a minor's access to contraceptives do not necessarily regu-
late behavior; rather, "the statute has the important symbolic effect
of communicating disapproval of sexual activity by minors [and]
is defended as a form of propaganda, rather than a regulation of
behavior." Justice Stevens' assertion reflects the Wade Court's
view that legislators should not enact laws for the purpose of dis-
couraging illicit sexual conduct.87 Justice Stevens, however, con-
cluded that nothing was wrong with the state serving a teaching
function. Nonetheless, since the result of the state's attempt to
persuade might be harmful to the minors it is trying to protect,
Justice Stevens concluded that the restriction on access to contra-
ceptives did not satisfy the significant interest standard. 9
C. No Right of Access to Contraceptives
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Carey, clearly disa-
greed that regulating a minor's access to contraceptives did not
serve a significant state interest." However, he pointed to no actual
83. 431 U.S. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The Justice contended that the state regulation "infringes the privacy interests of married
females between the ages of 14 and 16" and was, therefore, invalid. Id. at 707.
84. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
87. 410 U.S. at 147-48.
88. 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
89. Id. at 715-16. Justice Stevens contended that "the propaganda technique used in this
case significantly increases the risk of unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease." He analog-
ized the situation to a state deciding to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by prohibit-
ing the use of safety helmets. Id. at 715.
90. Id. at 717-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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state interest other than to discourage unmarried minors from hav-
ing sexual intercourse." Justice Rehnquist in effect advocates the
imposition of public morality on minors. Although he may be cor-
rect in wanting to impose public morality on minors or in stating
that their sexual activity was a proper concern of the state, he failed
to specify any harmful effects of access to contraceptives or to see
the harmful effects these restrictions have on minors.92 Justice
Rehnquist has apparently concluded that the state must be allowed
to determine the best interests of minors. However, making contra-
ceptives more readily available instead of limiting a minor's access
to them would seem to best protect the minor's interest.
V. Parental Involvement in a Minor's Personal Decisions
Although the state, based on the Carey decision, cannot interfere
with a minor's access to contraceptives, 4 the same may not be said
of the minor's parents. The Supreme Court has not explained in
detail the relationship between parents' rights and the rights of their
minor children. 5
The Danforth Court found objectionable a statute that gave par-
ents an absolute veto over the abortion decisions of their minor
children. 6 It concluded that the state requirement of parental con-
sent for a minor's abortion decision did not satisfy the significant
interest standard. 97
An examination of the state interests advanced in Danforth indi-
cates that the Court reached the proper result. The two reasons
suggested were safeguarding the family unit" and preserving paren-
91. Id. at 718-19.
92. See notes 69-73 supra.
93. Id.
94. 431 U.S. at 681-82.
95. The court noted this in Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977), when it
dealt with the issue of whether the distribution of contraceptives to minors without parental
consent was violative of the parents' constitutional rights. Id. at 1200.
The Irwin court held that parents had a constitutional right to help and advise their minor
children to make decisions regarding the use of contraceptives. Id. at 1214-15.
It is interesting to note that the same United States District Court reheard Doe v. Irwin
several months after the Carey decision. The Irwin court concluded that Carey did not require
a contrary result to its initial determination. 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
96. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
97. Id.
98. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (1975).
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tal authority.9 The imposition of an absolute parental veto over the
minor's and her physician's decision might not protect these two
valid interests. As the Danforth Court reasoned, "[i]t is difficult
. . . to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to
overrule this determination . . . will serve to strengthen the family
unit." 0 Similarly, it is doubtful that this veto power could preserve
parental authority "where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the preg-
nancy already has fractured the family structure." ''
Thus, the ultimate reason for the Court's decision was that the
state requirement of parental consent conferred to a third party an
absolute veto over the minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy,
without a sufficient justification for that restriction.
Many of the lower court cases which held an absolute parental
veto to be unconstitutional recognized that a less restrictive statute
might be acceptable.' Moreover, a majority of the Supreme Court
would probably refuse to foreclose forever parental participation in
their minor children's decision to use contraceptives. 0 3
Justice White agreed0 4 with Justice Stevens' belief that minors
do not have a constitutional right to use contraceptives, "not-
withstanding the combined objection of both parents and the
State." 05 Thus, these two Justices favor parental involvement in the
minor's decision to use contraceptives.
Justice Powell is an even stronger advocate of parental involve-
ment in a minor's abortion and contraceptive decisions. The Justice
rejected the statute in Carey not because it infringed upon the
minor's right but because it "prohibits parents from distributing
contraceptives to their children, a restriction that unjustifiably in-
terferes with parental interests in rearing their children."''0
Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquest concluded
99. Id.
100. 428 U.S. at 75.
101. Id.
102. See Doe v. Exon, 416 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Neb. 1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F.
Supp. 534, 538 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 567
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
103. 431 US. at 702-19.
104. Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
105. Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
106. Id. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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that minors had no right of access to contraceptives, 17 both Justices
would probably favor a parental consent or consultation require-
ment. Justice Rehnquist's sole concern was the deterrence of prom-
iscuous sexual activity among minors. 08 Parental involvement in a
minor's contraceptive decision would at least have some impact on
the sexual activity of minors. Therefore, one can conclude that both
Justices would prefer parental involvement to the unrestricted right
the Carey plurality currently gives minors. Thus, five Justices, or a
majority of the Supreme Court would support parental consent or
consultation in a minor's contraceptive decision.
Justice Powell and the other advocates of a parental consent stat-
ute contend that requiring minors to seek parental guidance in the
area of contraception would be consistent with Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth' and Bellotti v. Baird.10 In fact,
they argue that Danforth explicitly suggested a statute which would
assure consultation between parent and child."' Justice Stewart, in
his concurring opinion in Danforth, believed that the state might
further a constitutionally acceptable end if it encouraged minors to
seek the counseling and understanding of their parents before mak-
ing the decision to use contraceptives."'
Proponents of this type of statute believe that requiring parental
consent or consultation would best serve the state's interest in pro-
tecting minors from making improvident or immature decisions."3
Most parents, they would contend, are interested in their children's
welfare and would not automatically veto the minor's decision."'
Giving parents the right to consent might be the proper method of
fostering the minor's welfare." 5
Any constitutionally protected juvenile right to privacy must be
balanced with the constitutionally protected "parents' claim to au-
thority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
107. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text supra.
108. 431 U.S. at 718-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
110. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
111. 431 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. 428 U.S. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
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.... )""" A statute which requires parental consent, however, pre-
determines that the parents' rights to "the custody, care and nur-
ture of the child . . .,"" are superior to the right of the minor to
decide whether or not to use contraceptives. This predetermination
may be premised on two principles:"' first, that the family unit is
important to our society and must be legally preserved," 9 and sec-
ond, that the use of contraceptives by minors without parental con-
sent disrupts the family unit.'2
The Supreme Court has expressed the view that the rights of the
family are at times superior to those of the state.'2' The rights and
responsibilities to build, maintain and guide the family "reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."'22
The Supreme Court has indicated that parental authority in deter-
mining the upbringing of children "is basic in the structure of our
society.' ' 23 The integrity of the family, therefore, is constitutionally
protected.
Proponents of a parental consent statute urge that exclusion of
parents from the knowledge that their children use contraceptives
would disrupt and destroy the family unit.' 24 They contend that to
exclude parents from this decision would prematurely free children
from the advantages of the advice and guidance of their parents.'25
Conversely, a parental consent statute makes no exception for mi-
nors who are supporting themselves, are mature, emancipated or
receiving guidance elsewhere. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate
that the family structure will be destroyed if minors are allowed to
make decisions regarding contraceptives for themselves.126
In this situation a minor's right to privacy may conflict with
116. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
117. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166.
118. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Con-
traceptive Controversy, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1001, 1014-15 (1975).
119. Id. at 1015.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
122. 321 U.S. at 166.
123. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 639.
124. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. at 1211.
125. Id.
126. See 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1017-18.
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parents' rights to care for and guide their children. To give minors
access to contraceptives without parental consent undermines par-
ental authority; to require parental consent before giving minors
access to contraceptives denies the minor's right to privacy. Al-
though these two important interests are constitutionally protected,
a majority of the Supreme Court would appear to favor parental
consent rather than unrestricted use of contraceptives by minors.12
VI. Conclusion
The right to privacy of adults is an important right that the courts
and legislatures must carefully guard. Similarly, a minor's right to
privacy is of fundamental importance. The highest Court has as-
serted that minors are no longer considered totally lacking in legal
competence." 9 In general, a minor's right to privacy may deserve the
same constitutional protection as an adult's right. Carey ensures
this right to privacy by allowing minors to make personal decisions
regarding contraceptives without governmental intrusion.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide, however, if parents have a
right to intervene in the minor's decision to use contraceptives. The
best approach might be that neither the courts nor the legislatures
are the proper judges of this.matter, since each parent-child rela-
tionship is special and dynamic. Nonetheless, until the Court does
decide the question of parental involvement Carey gives minors the
right to decide whether or not to use contraceptives without state
intervention.
Victor J. D'Ammora
127. See notes 57-76 and 105-126 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 104-108 and accompanying text supra.
129. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). The Court's previous view was that, in the eyes of the law, minors were like
the mentally incompetent, having a right to custody and not liberty. 387 U.S. at 17.
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